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• Despite the resultant disutility, some people,
in particular the poor, are still engaged in
behavior carrying social stigma, such as selling
body parts, child labor, prostitution, abduction
and human trafficking, drug abuse as well as
toxic wastes.
• Poverty is the immediate and popular
interpretation of obnoxious markets. However,
t h ef a c tt h a te v e na m o n gt h ep o o r e s tn o t
everyone is engaged in stigmatized behavior
suggests other factors matter.
• When consequences of falling behind on
social ladders is grave, concern for status shapes
stigmatized behavior. Examples:
1) Failure to access informal insurance;
2) Low likelihood of marriage in the tightening
marriage market;
3) Mistrust, stress and poor health outcomes.
• We suspect that community level inequality
measures may not be able to capture
heterogeneity in the distribution.
• Moreover, peer influence might stigmatized
behavior, as the associated disutility reduces
when more peers engage in, generating
negative externality due to the social multiplier.
• Empirical economic studies on stigmatized
behavior are largely absent due to lack of data.
Three wave (2005, 2007, 2010) panel data
Census-type, 800-900 households
18 random remote villages in rural Guizhou, China
More than 20 ethnic groups
Detailed information on household demographics, 
income, consumption, transfers, blood donation, 
and expenditures and incomes related to gift 
exchanges and household ceremonies.
Blood donation compensation accounts for a large 
share of cash income for donors.
The unique Karst landform in the surveyed area  
and the isolated remote rural communities enable 
reference group definition.
 Long-term (10 years) gift-exchange records
 Spontaneous and written 
 all households and all gift links
 3 villages among the 18 surveyed villages
 Ceremonies: wedding, funeral, childbirth, 
moving, come-of-age…
 Cash gift and in-kind gift
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Fig. 1 Karst Landform for One of the Eighteen Villages 
Fig. 3 The Clan System and Gift Exchange Network in One Village
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Fig. 5 Inflating Gift Spending(all households)
Fig. 6 Gift-givingInflationfor ReciprocalHouseholds
Fig. 7 Gift-giving Inflation for Reciprocal
Households by Corresponding Ceremonies
PEER INFLUENCE
Fig. 5 Peer Influence on Household Blood Donation Decision
EMPIRICAL ESTIMATION
EMPIRICAL ESTIMATION (cont.)
 A 100% rise in peers’ engagement in blood sales 
increases one’s sales probability by 12%-21%, sales 
value by 9%-12%, and a second household member 
selling blood by 9%-16%. The results are robust to 
adding heterogeneous intensities of social ties and 
definitions of reference groups.
 Household-specific measures of relative status 
plays an important role in shaping stigma behavior. 
However, status concern is not captured by the 
conventional community-specific inequality 
measures.
 Our results call for a big caution using the well-
accepted Gini index in predicting social behavior.
 Special attention should be given to the negative 
externality originated from peers’ stigmatized 
behavior.  
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RELATIVE CONCERN
• Reference Group Definition
Natural village boundary, Gift networks…
• Runciman (1966) argues that one is deprived if
the others in the reference group possess
something that one does not have.
• Conventional Relative Income Measures
Gini; Rank, Rankgini…
•R D A ,R D I
• Wildman Relative Deprivation Index
• Deaton Relative Deprivation Index
Fig. 4 Relative Deprivation and Blood Donation Participation
• Measuring Peers’ Donation Behavior
1) Simple average donation;
2) Average donation weighted by centrality;
3) Average donation weighted by gift intensity.
• Three Peer Effect Identification Strategies
1) Strategy 1: conventional IVs: community average
income and sanitary conditions;
2) Strategy 2: centrality-based reweighting;
3) Strategy 3: spatial instruments from network
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Peer Influence on Household Blood Donation Decision MAIN CONCLUSIONS